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Abstract
BACKGROUND—In August 2016, the Food and Drug Administration advised US blood centers 
to screen all whole blood and apheresis donations for Zika virus (ZIKV) with an individual-donor 
nucleic acid test (ID-NAT) or to use approved pathogen reduction technology (PRT). The cost of 
implementing this guidance nationally has not been assessed.
STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS—Scenarios were constructed to characterize approaches to 
ZIKV screening, including universal ID-NAT, risk-based seasonal allowance of minipool (MP) 
NAT by state, and universal MP-NAT. Data from the 2015 National Blood Collection and 
Utilization Survey (NBCUS) were used to characterize the number of donations nationally and by 
state. For each scenario, the estimated cost per donor ($3–$9 for MP-NAT, $7–$13 for ID-NAT) 
was multiplied by the estimated number of relevant donations from the NBCUS. Cost of PRT was 
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calculated by multiplying the cost per unit ($50–$125) by the number of units approved for PRT. 
Prediction intervals for costs were generated using Monte Carlo simulation methods.
RESULTS—Screening all donations in the 50 states and DC for ZIKV by ID-NAT would cost 
$137 million (95% confidence interval [CI], $109–$167) annually. Allowing seasonal MP-NAT in 
states with lower ZIKV risk could reduce NAT screening costs by 18% to 25%. Application of 
PRT to all platelet (PLT) and plasma units would cost $213 million (95% CI, $156–$304).
CONCLUSION—Universal ID-NAT screening for ZIKV will cost US blood centers more than 
$100 million annually. The high cost of PRT for apheresis PLTs and plasma could be mitigated if, 
once validated, testing for transfusion transmissible pathogens could be eliminated.
Optimizing strategies to protect the United States blood supply from Zika virus (ZIKV) is 
challenging for policy makers and the blood collection community.1 The rapid spread of 
ZIKV through the western hemisphere in 2015 and 2016 was coupled with knowledge gaps 
in disease transmission dynamics, inconsistent surveillance of mosquitoes that transmit 
ZIKV to humans, and resource constraints in case detection.2 Despite typically mild 
presentation in most adults, ZIKV can cause serious adverse outcomes in infants born to 
women infected during pregnancy, including microcephaly, as well as and fetal loss in 
pregnant women.3,4 Although rare, ZIKV has been associated with Guillain-Barré syndrome 
in previous outbreaks and in 0.3% of US cases reported in the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia.5–7
Approximately 80% of individuals infected with ZIKV are asymptomatic,8 and sexual 
transmission from returned infected travelers can result in transmission in nonendemic 
areas.9 This unique constellation of characteristics renders ineffective blood donor deferral 
strategies based on travel history or clinical symptoms alone. As a result, the US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) has recommended that all blood donations in the United States 
be screened for ZIKV using investigational individual-donor nucleic acid tests (ID-NATs) or 
alternatively, for apheresis platelets (PLTs) and plasma, that donations be subjected to FDA-
approved pathogen reduction technology (PRT).10,11
Transfusion-transmitted ZIKV was documented in Brazil during the 2015 and 2016 outbreak 
via PLT transfusions.12,13 A retrospective study of archived samples collected from 
asymptomatic blood donors during the 2013 and 2014 French Polynesia ZIKV outbreak 
found that 2.8% of donations contained detectable ZIKV,14,15 and after implementation of 
NAT screening in Puerto Rico in April 2016, an increasing percentage of donations were 
reactive, with a peak weekly incidence of 1.1% reactive reported during the second week of 
June 2016.16 These findings suggest the potential for transfusion-transmitted infection 
during outbreaks in the absence of testing or PRT.
The Aedes aegypti mosquito, which is endemic to many regions of the United States, has 
been implicated as the primary transmitter of ZIKV throughout the western hemisphere, 
although most reported cases in the mainland United States have been travel-associated.7,17 
The risk of asymptomatic infection among donors – through travel, sexual acquisition, or an 
unrecognized local outbreak propagated by A. aegypti mosquitoes – has motivated the FDA 
and blood collection centers to consider aggressive screening policies. After the first cluster 
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of mosquito-transmitted ZIKV cases was identified in the mainland United States, the FDA 
published recommendations for universal ID-NAT screening or PRT.18 The FDA advised a 
phased implementation approach, recommending immediate adoption of ID-NAT in states 
with documented mosquito-borne transmission, adoption within 4 weeks in high-risk states 
and adoption within 12 weeks for all other states.11
Screening for ZIKV among US blood donations is currently under way using two ID-NAT 
assays available under investigational new drug (IND) protocols. Guidance for post-IND 
NAT screening for ZIKV has not yet been released. Specifically, there are no 
recommendations for appropriate use of minipool (MP) NAT for ZIKV, although MP-NAT 
has been incorporated into blood center guidance for screening of other transfusion-
transmissible pathogens.19,20 MP-NAT screening for other pathogens, in which donor 
samples are typically tested in pools of 6 or 16 samples, can enhance efficiency and reduce 
costs. However, the sensitivity of MP- versus ID-NAT screening for ZIKV must be 
considered before adoption. Because ZIKV NAT screening technology is currently under 
development, the relative sensitivity of ID- and MP-NAT screening is still under study.
The aim of this study was to provide context for future planning by projecting the annual 
cost of blood donor screening for ZIKV, or use of PRT on donated units, in the United States 
using data from the 2015 National Blood Collection and Utilization Survey (NBCUS). To 
date, the aggregate national costs of implementing ZIKV assay screening or PRT for routine, 
noninvestigational purposes have not been characterized. The objectives of this study were: 
1) to construct plausible scenarios for ZIKV donation screening including universal ID-NAT, 
a combination of MP-NAT and ID-NAT dependent on state-specific risk, and universal MP-
NAT; 2) to project annual costs of screening under each scenario; and 3) to project costs 
associated with implementation of FDA-approved PRT for apheresis PLTs and plasma.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Three scenarios were constructed as a basis for NAT screening cost projections. Scenario 1, 
“universal ID-NAT,” reflects the current FDA recommendation for ID-NAT of all donations 
in 50 states and the District of Columbia (Table 1). The NBCUS does not include US 
territories, so the cost of ZIKV screening in US territories was not considered in this 
analysis. Scenarios 2a and 2b, “MP-NAT acceptable, low Aedes threshold” and “MP-NAT 
acceptable, high Aedes threshold,” respectively, specify conditions under which blood 
collection centers would perform ID-NAT or MP-NAT based on state-based risk 
considerations described below. Scenario 3, “universal MP-NAT,” represents an approach 
that could be considered if MP-NAT were deemed adequate by FDA for ZIKV donor 
screening.
Scenarios 2a and 2b specify ID-NAT and MP-NAT screening based on state-specific risk 
characterized by history of locally transmitted mosquito-borne infections, travel patterns 
from ZIKV-endemic areas, and published estimates of mosquito abundance (Fig. 1).21 State-
specific history of mosquito-borne infections was based on a review of outbreaks including 
locally-acquired Zika, Chikungunya, or Dengue virus cases reported to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).18,22 Travel and mosquito abundance characteristics 
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were based on a 2016 publication quantifying monthly volume of entry to the United States 
from ZIKV-endemic countries as well as estimated A. aegypti abundance in 50 US cities 
covering the known range of A. aegypti, with city-level data extrapolated to each state.21 
Scenarios 2a and 2b specify year-round ID-NAT screening in states with previously 
documented outbreaks with local transmission of Zika, Chikungunya, or Dengue virus 
(Florida, Hawaii, Texas) and in states with more than 100,000 monthly returned travelers 
from ZIKV-endemic countries (California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Florida, Georgia, 
New York); in all other states, MP-NAT would be allowed unless a threshold of estimated A. 
aegypti was reached in a given month. Scenario 2a would require the following: year-round 
ID-NAT in states with a history of mosquito-borne outbreaks of Zika, Chikungunya, or 
Dengue viruses or high-volume travel from ZIKV-endemic countries; for all other states, 
MP-NAT would be acceptable only during months when projected A. aegypti abundance 
was none to low.21 Scenario 2b reflects a more flexible approach, which would also require 
year-round ID-NAT in states with a history of mosquito-borne outbreaks or high-volume 
travel; for all other states, MP-NAT would be acceptable except during months when 
projected A. aegypti abundance was high.
Estimating the costs of screening nationwide under Scenarios 2a and 2b required calculation 
of the total number of donations that would be subject to ID-NAT or MP-NAT screening, 
which is a function of the number of months of the year requiring each type of screening 
under each scenario. National estimates for whole blood–derived and apheresis donations in 
2015 were generated from the 2015 NBCUS, which included a survey of blood collection 
centers in the 50 US states and the District of Columbia. Detailed methods for survey design 
and statistical generation of national estimates are published elsewhere.23 A sampling frame 
of 222 blood collection centers for the 2015 NBCUS was based primarily on the FDA Blood 
Establishment Registration (BER) database, which includes an entry for each fixed 
collection site run by each blood center. Of the 174 blood centers that responded to the 
NBCUS in 2015, a total of 154 operated in a single state, 11 operated in two states, seven 
operated in three states and two operated in more than three states. For blood centers with 
collection sites in a single state, all donations were assigned to the state listed in the FDA 
BER database. For centers with collection sites in multiple states, the number of donations 
collected in each state was proportionally assigned based on the number of collection sites in 
each state divided by the total number of collection sites affiliated with the blood center 
(Fig. 2A).
To calculate the number of donations per blood center, the following NBCUS variables were 
summed: number of manual whole blood collections, number of apheresis red blood cell 
(RBC) collections (excluding collections concurrent with apheresis collection of PLTs or 
plasma), number of apheresis PLT collections, and number of apheresis plasma collections. 
Information on the number of collections involving PLTs and plasma concurrently was not 
collected through the NBCUS. To account for nonresponse and missing data, weighting and 
imputation were used per methods described previously.23
For Scenarios 2a and 2b, each state was assigned ID-NAT or MP-NAT for each month of the 
year depending on history of local transmission, travel volume from ZIKV-endemic 
countries, and mosquito abundance; based on monthly characterization of risk, each state 
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was assigned a proportion of the year for which ID-NAT would be specified and a 
proportion for which MP-NAT would be specified. These proportions were multiplied by the 
total number of donations collected annually in each state, which resulted in an estimated 
number of donations screened by ID-NAT and MP-NAT, respectively. The number of 
donations for each test type was then aggregated to the national level by testing type for cost 
calculation.
Cost estimates per donation for ID- and MP-NAT screening were based on personal 
communications with blood center administrators and published estimates for NAT donor 
screening for other transfusion-transmitted infections. All cost inputs were based on 
anticipated post-IND costs. During IND, costs paid by blood centers cannot include 
recoupment of research and development expenses.24 Post-IND cost estimates from 
literature involving other transfusion-transmitted infections ranged from $7 to $18 for MP-
NAT and from $5 to $33 for ID-NAT, although these studies were published in the early to 
mid 2000s.20–28 The cost inputs used for these analyses were based primarily on personal 
communications with blood center administrators, who based anticipated costs of post-IND 
ZIKV screening on current costs for West Nile Virus testing (Personal communication with 
Louis M. Katz MD, Chief Medical Officer, America’s Blood Centers, 2016). For MP-NAT, 
the estimated cost input used for in this study was $6 (range, $3–$9) per donation, and for 
ID-NAT, the estimated cost per donation was $10 (range, $7–$13). These per donation cost 
estimates included expenses related to reagents, consumables, and labor, but did not consider 
testing platform and infrastructure costs.
For each of the screening scenarios, the number of donations subject to ID-NAT or MP-NAT 
nationally was multiplied by the cost of each screening test: (number of donations screened 
by ID-NAT) × (cost per donation for ID-NAT) + (number of donations screened by MP-
NAT) × (cost per donation for MP-NAT). Donations included all manual whole blood 
collections and apheresis collections. Monte Carlo simulations were used to create 
prediction intervals that incorporate error from both donation and cost estimates. For the 
simulations, donations were assigned a normal distribution based on the standard error of the 
NBCUS estimate, and screening costs were assigned triangular distributions. Prediction 
intervals were generated based on 10,000 simulations.
Because cost calculations for screening scenarios required state-specific blood donation 
estimates from the 2015 NBCUS, state-specific rates of donation could be estimated to 
provide context for interpretation of cost estimates. To calculate rates of donation per 1000 
population by state, the total number of manual whole blood, apheresis RBC, and apheresis 
PLT collections in each state was divided by the population eligible for donation and 
multiplied by 1000 (Fig. 2B). The eligible donor population was estimated from age-specific 
census data, with the upper bound for donor eligibility was set at age 74, and the lower 
bound was set at 17, except in states that allow 16-year-olds to donate.31
Interstate distribution patterns were also examined by state to estimate how blood products 
are shared between states and how sharing might affect the impact of state-specific screening 
requirements. Calculating imports and exports required an analysis of units rather than 
donations. Imports and exports were only calculated for RBC units collected by either 
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manually (i.e., whole blood) or by apheresis, since the distribution data were sufficiently 
robust for RBCs but not for other blood products. Imports were determined by subtracting 
the number of units distributed from the number of units transfused in each state; exports 
were determined by subtracting the number of units transfused in each state from the 
number of units distributed. To estimate the number of transfused RBC units by state, 
transfused units were assigned to states based on location of the transfusing hospital listed in 
the 2013 American Hospital Association database. To estimate the number of units 
distributed per state, units were assigned to the location of the blood collection center listed 
in the FDA BER; if the blood center had collection sites in multiple states, units were 
assigned to states based on the apportioning methods described above (Fig. 2C).
To estimate costs of PRT, a cost estimate of $75 (range, $50–$125) per unit was used. This 
estimate was based on personal communication with blood center administrators and was 
consistent with cost reported in published literature.30–32 The cost per unit was then 
multiplied by the total number of apheresis PLT and plasma units distributed in the United 
States based on the 2015 NBCUS survey. For this analysis, the units considered for PRT 
were apheresis PLT and apheresis plasma units only. Currently PRT is not FDA approved for 
use with whole blood–derived PLTs and therefore whole blood–derived PLTs were not 
included. While PRT is approved for whole blood–derived plasma, these units were assumed 
to be collected concurrently with RBC units, for which PRT is not currently approved; in 
this instance PRT on whole blood–derived plasma units would be redundant for ZIKV 
prevention since the entire donation (RBC and plasma) would be NAT screened. For net PRT 
costs, the cost of ID-NAT screening ($10 per donation) was subtracted from the cost of PRT 
for eligible units. No calculations were made for PRT for whole blood–derived or apheresis 
RBC units, since PRT for RBC units is not FDA approved.11 Monte Carlo methods using 
10,000 simulations were employed to create prediction intervals, with apheresis PLTs and 
plasma units assigned a normal distribution and PRT costs assigned a beta distribution. All 
analyses were conducted using statistical software (SAS, Version 9.3, SAS Institute).
RESULTS
In 2015, a total of 13,769,000 (95% confidence interval [CI], 13,127,000–14,411,000) 
donations were collected at blood centers in the 50 states and the District of Columbia 
(Table 1). These donations were collected across states with variability in the risk of ZIKV 
infection among donors based on history of mosquito-borne outbreaks, travel patterns, and 
A. aegypti abundance. For scenarios dependent on state-specific risk factors, states would be 
required to implement ID-NAT, versus MP-NAT, screening from zero to 12 months of the 
year (Fig. 1), which led to differences in national cost estimates.
States also varied in the number of donations, population rates of donation, and RBC import 
and export (within the 50 states and the District of Columbia) activity. Five states 
(California, Florida, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas) had more than 500,000 donations 
in 2015, and 15 states (Alaska, Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, 
North Dakota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West 
Virginia, Wyoming) had fewer than 100,000 donations (Fig. 2A). Rates of donation per 
100,000 donor-eligible population were highest (>80 per 1000) in Arkansas, Idaho, 
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Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wisconsin (Fig. 2B). In 2015, the five 
states that exported more than 100,000 RBC units to other states included Arkansas, Iowa, 
Missouri, Montana, and Wisconsin; the five states that imported more than 100,000 RBC 
units from other states included California, Florida, Maryland, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania (Fig. 2C).
Under NAT screening Scenario 1, which represents universal ID-NAT screening for ZIKV, 
100% of donations would be subject to screening by ID-NAT (Table 1). The projected cost 
of screening all units annually for ID-NAT is $137 million (95% prediction interval, $109–
$167 million) (Table 2). Under Scenario 2a, which would allow MP-NAT in states with 
lower risk of ZIKV importation and transmission, but only during months when A. aegypti 
abundance was estimated to be none to low, 53.8% of donations would be tested by ID-NAT 
and 46.2% by MP-NAT. The total calculated cost of screening under this scenario was $112 
million (95% prediction interval, $91–$134 million) annually. Under Scenario 2b, which 
would allow MP-NAT in states with a lower risk of ZIKV transmission and importation 
except when A. aegypti abundance was high, 36.9% of donations would be screened by ID-
NAT and 63.2% by MP-NAT at an estimated cost of $103 million (95% prediction interval, 
$81–$125 million) annually. Finally, the estimated cost of NAT screening in Scenario 3, 
which represents universal MP-NAT initial screening, was $82 million (95% prediction 
interval, $54–$111 million) annually.
If PRT were to be applied to the 2,803,000 (95% CI, 2,521,000–3,085,000) units of 
apheresis PLTs and apheresis plasma collected in the United States annually, the total annual 
cost of pathogen inactivation would be $213 million (95% prediction interval, $156–$304 
million). The cost savings conferred by not testing apheresis PLT and plasma units with ID-
NAT for ZIKV would be $12 million (95% prediction interval, $10–$15 million), with a net 
cost of $201 million (95% prediction interval, $143–$292 million).
DISCUSSION
Blood centers in the 50 states and the District of Columbia collect an estimated 13.8 million 
whole blood and apheresis donations annually, and the FDA currently requires screening of 
all donations for ZIKV by ID-NAT under IND. Once research protocol testing concludes, 
and if ZIKV screening is implemented routinely following current FDA guidance, ID-NAT 
screening for ZIKV alone in the United States could cost blood centers $137 million (95% 
CI, $109–$167) annually. This cost estimate is consistent with an estimate presented by the 
AABB at a November 2016 FDA Blood Products Advisory Committee meeting, suggesting 
that the FDA recommendation for universal ID-NAT for ZIKV would “incur direct costs 
well in excess of one hundred million dollars per year.” 33 Scenarios that allow MP-NAT in 
states with lower risk of importation and local transmission during months with lower 
estimated A. aegypti abundance could reduce screening costs by 18.2% to 24.8% nationally. 
These findings can be used to guide future discussions regarding transfusion-transmitted 
ZIKV prevention strategies as the epidemiology of the virus in the United States and 
transmission dynamics are better understood.
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Scenarios allowing MP-NAT screening in lower risk regions of the United States follow a 
logic similar to FDA recommendations for West Nile virus (WNV) MP-NAT screening with 
triggering for ID-NAT.19 However, unlike WNV recommendations for ID-NAT triggering 
when a WNV-positive donor threshold is reached, this study examined scenarios that 
assigned states to ID- and MP-NAT screening protocols based on projected seasonal and 
geographic risk, irrespective of case detection. Use of a ZIKV risk-projection model, 
including seasonal mosquito abundance, travel patterns, and history of local transmission,21 
is particularly important with ZIKV given the limitations and variations in real-time 
mosquito surveillance and case detection across the United States. Mosquito-borne (i.e., 
locally acquired) ZIKV transmission in the United States was first reported in Puerto Rico in 
December 2015.34 During June through August 2016, southern Florida experienced the first 
outbreak on the US mainland, which resulted in 139 reported infections.18 Although the 
number of reported locally acquired cases in the 50 states and the District of Columbia is 
low and appears to have been contained geographically with aggressive vector control 
efforts, the possibility of further geographic spread of ZIKV exists in regions where A. 
aegypti mosquitos are found.
Because ZIKV is sexually transmitted, additional considerations beyond likelihood of 
mosquito-borne transmission, such as travel volume from endemic countries, were 
considered in Scenarios 2a and 2b. A scenario for universal initial screening of all donations 
for ZIKV by MP-NAT (Scenario 3) was also considered assuming adequate sensitivity of 
MP-NAT screening to prevent transmissions, and the potential that prevalence of ZIKV in 
blood donors remains rare in the mainland United States. Although not the most sensitive 
approach, this is the standard for NAT screening donations for most viral blood-borne 
pathogens in the United States. Currently the FDA recommends MP-NAT for viral blood-
borne pathogens including human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis B virus, and 
hepatitis C virus, with ID-NAT follow-up on positive MPs.20
The examination of state variation in collections, imports, exports, and population donation 
rates provides potentially useful context for discussion of national screening policies for 
ZIKV and other emerging pathogens. States with the highest risk of Zika importation and 
transmission (e.g., Florida, California, and New York) also have large numbers of imported 
blood products from other parts of the country (Fig. 2). The states exporting the most blood 
(e.g., Iowa, Montana, and Wisconsin) are low-ZIKV-risk states. Further, the rates of 
donation tend to be higher in low ZIKV-risk states (e.g., Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, and South Dakota). As a nation, the United States relies more heavily, in a relative 
sense, on states in the North and Midwest to maintain the blood supply. Allowing MP-NAT 
screening for ZIKV in low-risk regions, assuming that MP-NAT screening achieves adequate 
sensitivity, may reduce the national cost burden of implementing ZIKV screening.
Adoption of PRT for apheresis PLT and plasma products confers an added benefit in 
mitigating the risk associated with other emerging transfusion-transmitted infections.35 
However, the high cost associated with the technology may prohibit adoption. Additionally, 
PRT is not approved for RBC products, which constitute the majority of transfused blood 
products, although clinical trials evaluating safety and efficacy are under way.36 The cost of 
PRT adoption was not modeled such that current routine donor screening for transfusion-
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transmitted infections (e.g., HIV, WNV, and Hepatitis) could be discontinued. Additionally, 
cost savings associated with elimination of bacterial testing and irradiation for licensed PRT 
components at blood centers were not considered. Although PRT might obviate the need for 
leukoreduction, no cost savings related to leukoreduction were included in the net PRT 
calculations as only apheresis units were considered, and apheresis methods include 
leukoreduction. Future studies should assess whether PRT may provide sufficient safety 
enhancement and risk reduction to obviate some current routine donor laboratory screening 
for transfusion-transmitted infections as well as other per-unit processing costs.
These findings are subject to a number of limitations. First, several assumptions are required 
to estimate the cost per donation for routine ZIKV screening and PRT. Screening is currently 
implemented via an IND protocol, so the cost of licensed ZIKV NAT screening was not 
available. Therefore, cost of licensed ZIKV NAT screening may be higher or lower than 
what was used in this analysis. Estimates from the literature for routine donor testing by ID- 
and MP-NAT for other pathogens were highly variable. Costs of PRT were highly variable 
based on personal communications with blood center administrators and were primarily 
based on costs reported in the recent literature.31 Second, while the 2015 NBCUS had a 
response rate of 90% for non–hospital-based blood collection centers and 72% for hospital-
based blood collection centers, responses were weighted for nonresponse and missing data 
were imputed to develop national estimates. Estimation at the state level may introduce a 
greater level of error. The NBCUS survey was not designed to estimate state-level 
collections and the pattern of nonresponse in 2015 was such that a simple weighted 
population estimate would have deficiencies due to the small number of blood centers in 
each state. Therefore, the number of units collected in a given state were approximated 
based on the proportion of local collection centers in that state; this method assumes that 
collections are equivalent at each site, and the impact of this assumption is unknown.
Third, the relative sensitivity of ID- versus MP-NAT, as well as the sensitivity required to 
prevent transmission, is still under study. Therefore, the cost projections presented here do 
not consider the costs associated with the possibility of transfusion-associated infection and 
related complications, resulting from a ZIKV donor infection missed with a lower sensitivity 
screening approach such as MP-NAT. This study was based on the assumption that FDA’s 
recommendation to test all donors for ZIKV, or to perform PRT on all donated units, will 
continue indefinitely, although it is possible that the recommendation could change if risk of 
infection in the donor population diminishes drastically as the outbreak in the Americas 
subsides. Finally, the cost associated with implementation of screening or PRT was 
estimated but the safety benefit was not quantified. The number of adverse pregnancy 
outcomes or Guillain-Barré syndrome cases that would be averted through ZIKV NAT 
screening of the blood supply is unknown. Once sufficient data on US ZIKV epidemiology, 
transmission dynamics, and transmissibility are available, further study on number of 
recipient infections averted, and donor infections missed, under each scenario used in this 
analysis is required.
In conclusion, the costs associated with protecting the blood supply through universal ID-
NAT for ZIKV for all donors in the United States are substantial. While the safety benefits 
of PRT are promising, its costs currently far exceed costs of screening, particularly given 
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that RBC donations will continue to require screening until the technology can receive 
regulatory approval. The high cost of PRT could be mitigated if, once validated, routine 
screening for many transfusion-transmissible infections were eliminated. As the 
transmissibility dynamics, pathogenesis, and epidemiology of ZIKV are better understood, 
the cost projections presented in this study could inform cost–benefit analyses. Finally, this 
study demonstrates that the NBCUS national survey data can be utilized to project the costs 
of various blood safety interventions.
ABBREVIATIONS
BER Blood Establishment Registration
ID individual donor
IND investigational new drug
MP(s) minipool(s)
NBCUS National Blood Collection and Utilization Survey
PRT pathogen reduction technology
WNV West Nile virus
ZIKV Zika virus
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(A) Number of months per year that would require ID-NAT screening, versus MP-NAT 
screening, for Zika virus under Scenario 2a, “MP-NAT acceptable, low Aedes threshold,” by 
state. (B) Number of months per year that would require ID-NAT screening, versus MP-NAT 
screening, for Zika virus under Scenario 2b, “MP-NAT acceptable, high Aedes threshold,” 
by state.
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(A) Number of donations (in thousands) per state, defined as the sum of manual whole blood 
an apheresis collections in 2015. (B) Estimates of rate of donation per thousand donor-
eligible population, by state, for 2015. (C) Estimated number of RBC units (in thousands) 
imported and exported, by state, in 2015.
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TABLE 1
Scenarios constructed for screening the blood supply by various combinations of ID-NAT and MP-NAT 
methods











1. Universal ID-NAT Assume current FDA recommendations hold for ID-NAT in all states 
year round
100.0 0.0
2a. MP-NAT acceptable, low 
Aedes threshold†
• Year-round ID-NAT in states with history of local 
transmission or high travel volume*
• For all other states, MP-NAT only allowed during 
months when estimated A. aegypti abundance none to 
low
53.8 46.2
2b. MP-NAT acceptable, high 
Aedes threshold†
• Year-round ID-NAT in states with history of local 
transmission or high travel volume*
• For all other states, MP-NAT allowed except during 
months with high A. aegypti abundance
36.9 63.1
3. Universal MP-NAT† Possible future scenario if risk of Zika-infected donors is extremely 
low and MP-NAT deemed adequate for all donors
0.0 100.0
*
History of outbreaks was defined as locally transmitted (by mosquito) Dengue, Chikungunya, or Zika virus reported to CDC, and high travel 
volume was defined as more than 100,000 travelers entering the state monthly from a Zika-endemic country.
†
Scenario assumes that any MP testing positive by MP-NAT would be screened with ID-NAT, although the follow-up ID-NAT testing is not 
incorporated into the estimated percentage of units screened by each method.
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TABLE 2
Estimated number of donations (in thousands) that would be subject to Zika virus NAT by ID or MP screening 
based on 2015 estimates with national cost estimates for scenarios (in millions)
Scenario
Donations, in thousands* (95% CI)
Cost, in millions (95% prediction 
interval)ID-NAT screening MP-NAT screening
1. Universal ID-NAT 13,769 (13,127–14,411) $137 ($109–$167)
2a. MP-NAT acceptable, low Aedes threshold 7,414 (6,510–8,317) 6,355 (5,550–7,161) $112 ($91–$134)
2b. MP-NAT acceptable, high Aedes 
threshold
5,084 (4,248–5,920) 8,685 (7,792–9,578) $103 ($81–$125)
3. Universal MP-NAT 13,769 (13,127–14,411) $82 ($54–$111)
*
Includes manual whole blood collections, apheresis RBC collections (excluding collections concurrent with apheresis PLT or apheresis plasma 
collections), apheresis PLT collections, and apheresis plasma collections.
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